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Abstract—We present a novel way to compare the statistical
cost of privacy mechanisms using their Dobrushin coefficient.
Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for the Do-
brushin coefficient of a privacy mechanism in terms of its
maximal leakage and local differential privacy guarantees. Given
the geometric nature of the Dobrushin coefficient, this approach
provides some insights into the general statistical cost of these
privacy guarantees. We highlight the strength of this method by
applying our results to develop new bounds on the ℓ2-minimax
risk in a distribution estimation setting under maximal leakage
constraints. Specifically, we find its order with respect to the
sample size and privacy level, allowing a quantitative comparison
with the corresponding local differential privacy ℓ2-minimax risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several compelling definitions for privacy have
arisen, notable among them are the context-free (statistics
agnostic) notion of differential privacy and the context-aware
information-theoretic measures such as mutual information
and maximal leakage. Context-aware approaches provide
average-case privacy guarantees and allow for a range of
adversarial models.
Both context-free and context-aware definitions of privacy
require designing a probabilistic mapping (henceforth referred
to as privacy mechanism) that satisfies the desired privacy re-
quirement. Despite the operational interpretations, comparing
privacy leakage measures numerically does not provide much
insight. One approach is to evaluate the effect of the privacy
requirement on utility (i.e., the statistical cost of using the
corresponding privacy mechanism). The aim of this paper is
to provide a framework in which different privacy metrics can
be compared in terms of their general statistical cost.
We compare different privacy mechanisms via their Do-
brushin coefficient, which is equal to the contractivity co-
efficient of the mechanism with respect to total variation
distance. Specifically, we provide upper bounds on the privacy
guarantees of a local differentially private (L-DP) mechanism
and a maximal leakage (MaxL) private mechanism in terms
of its Dobrushin coefficient. Conversely, we provide upper
bounds on the Dobrushin coefficient of any mechanism in
terms of its L-DP and MaxL privacy guarantees. Since a small
Dobrushin coefficient means a highly contractive mapping, the
latter bounds are particularly useful to assess the cost of both
aforementioned privacy guarantees for a wide range of statis-
tical problems, including hypothesis testing and distribution
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estimation. More specifically, the Dobrushin coefficient can
be used to provide strong data processing inequalities (SDPIs)
for any f -divergence. Since these SDPIs are a fundamental
part of many standard statistical methodologies, e.g., Le Cam’s
method, the Dobrushin coefficient leads to an immediate
evaluation of the statistical cost of a privacy mapping.
We highlight the value of this approach by presenting new
results on the ℓ2-minimax risk for a distribution estimation
setting under MaxL constraints, i.e., we compute the best
worst-case expected ℓ2-loss of a distribution estimator when
using data sanitized by a privacy mechanism with specific
MaxL guarantees. We show that the minimax risk order with
respect to the sample size n and privacy level α has order
(n(2α − 1))−1. This is the first step to enable quantitative
comparisons with the corresponding local differential private
minimax risk (see, for example, [1]–[3]). The value of this
approach is in exploiting the connection between the Do-
brushin coefficient and Le Cam’s method to obtain bounds
more directly.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we intro-
duce the main concepts and terminology used in this paper. In
Section III we present our main results regarding the relation
between L-DP or MaxL privacy guarantees and the Dobrushin
coefficient of privacy mechanisms, and illustrate some of their
consequences in Section IV. In Section V we apply our results
to study the ℓ2-minimax risk of a distribution estimation
problem under maximal leakage constraints. The proof of our
main results are provided in Appendix A.
II. PROBLEM SETTING AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Privacy Notions
We assume that X and Y are finite sets. A privacy mecha-
nism is a function W : X × Y → R such that W (x, y) ≥ 0
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y and, for all x ∈ X ,∑
y∈Y
W (x, y) = 1. (1)
Let P(Z) be the set of probability measures on a discrete
set Z . Every privacy mechanism W : X × Y → R can be
identified with a mapping W ′ : P(X ) → P(Y) determined
by
W ′(P )(y) =
∑
x∈X
P (x)W (x, y), y ∈ Y. (2)
Note that this correspondence defines a bijection. Thus, by
abuse of notation, we denote by W both W and W ′.
Definition 1 ([4]). For α ∈ [0,∞], a privacy mechanism W
is said to be α-locally differentially private if
max
y∈Y
max
x1,x2∈X
W (x1, y)
W (x2, y)
≤ 2α. (3)
For convenience, we define 0/0 := 1 and 1/0 := ∞.
Following tradition, all logarithms are taken in base 2.
Definition 2 ([5]). For α ∈ [0,∞], a privacy mechanism W
is said to be α-MaxL private if∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) ≤ 2α. (4)
The operational significance of Def. 2 comes from the
following result of Issa et al. [5].
Proposition 1 ([5]). Let X and Y be random variables with
support X and Y , respectively. Define
L(X → Y ) := sup
U−X−Y
log
P
(
U = Uˆ(Y )
)
maxu∈U PU (u)
, (5)
where the support of U is finite but of arbitrary size, and Uˆ(Y )
is the maximum a posteriori estimator. Then,
L(X → Y ) = log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x). (6)
The Dobrushin coefficient of a probabilistic mapping is
defined as follows.
B. Dobrushin Coefficient
Definition 3 ([6]). The Dobrushin coefficient α(W ) of a
mapping W : P(X )→ P(Y) is defined by
α(W ) = max
x1,x2∈X
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)|. (7)
For P,Q ∈ P(Z), their total variation distance is given by
‖P −Q‖ =
1
2
∑
z∈Z
|P (z)−Q(z)|. (8)
In [6], Dobrushin provided the next characterization for α(W ).
Proposition 2 ([6]). For every mapping W : P(X )→ P(Y),
α(W ) = sup
P0,P1∈P(X )
‖P0−P1‖>0
‖W (P0)−W (P1)‖
‖P0 − P1‖
. (9)
It is straightforward to verify that the right hand side of (9)
is upper bounded by one for every W . In particular, α(W ) is
the constant of the contractive mapping W .
Note that when α(W ) is close to zero, the output of the
mappingW is essentially the same for every input distribution.
This cause severe degradation to the utility of any statistical
methodology applied to the output of this mapping. Thus,
this geometric feature of the Dobrushin coefficient offers a
quantitative assessment of the statistical cost of a mapping.
C. f -Divergences
Another important property of the Dobrushin coefficient
comes from its connection with f -divergences.
Definition 4. Let f : R+ → R be convex with f(1) = 0. For
P,Q ∈ P(Z), its f -divergence Df (P‖Q) is determined by
Df(P‖Q) :=
∑
z∈Z
Q(z)f
(
P (z)
Q(z)
)
. (10)
For W : P(X )→ P(Y), let ηf (W ) be defined by
ηf (W ) := sup
P0,P1∈P(X )
0<Df (P0‖P1)<∞
Df(W (P0)‖W (P1))
Df (P0‖P1)
. (11)
For example, f(x) = x log(x) leads to the KL-divergence,
Df (P‖Q) = DKL(P‖Q) :=
∑
z∈Z
P (z) log
P (z)
Q(z)
. (12)
For this choice of f it is customary to denote ηf by ηKL.
Similarly, when f(x) = |x − 1|/2, it is easy to show that
Df (P‖Q) = ‖P −Q‖. In this case, ηf is usually denoted by
ηTV. With this notation, Proposition 2 says that
ηTV(W ) = α(W ). (13)
In the sequel, ηTV and α are used interchangeably. Remarkably,
ηTV is an upper bound for ηf for every f , see, for example,
[7, Prop. II.4.10].
Proposition 3 ([7]). For every f : R+ → R convex with
f(1) = 0, it holds true that
ηf (W ) ≤ ηTV(W ). (14)
In particular, we have that ηKL(W ) ≤ ηTV(W ). Therefore,
for every privacy mechanism W and P0, P1 ∈ P(X ),
DKL(W (P0)‖W (P1)) ≤ ηTV(W )DKL(P0‖P1). (15)
This inequality will be used to derive a lower bound for
the ℓ2-minimax risk in a distribution estimation setting under
maximal leakage constraints. We finish this section pointing
out that more refined contraction coefficients have been the
subject of recent studies, see, for example, [8], [9] and
references therein.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Local Differential Privacy
The following theorem provides an upper bound for the
Dobrushin coefficient of a privacy mechanism in terms of its
L-DP guarantee.
Theorem 1. If a privacy mechanism W is α-locally differen-
tially private, then
ηTV(W ) ≤
2α − 1
2α + 1
. (16)
In [10, Corollary 11], Kairouz et al. obtained Thm. 1 as
a by-product of the characterization of the set of optimal
mechanisms for a certain type of optimization problems under
L-DP constraints. In this work, such a characterization is not
required in order to establish (16). This new approach provides
an alternative to study privacy notions for which optimal
mechanisms are not easily computable, for example, maximal
leakage.
The following theorem provides a converse to Theorem 1,
i.e., provides an upper bound for the L-DP guarantee of a
privacy mechanism in terms of its Dobrushin coefficient.
Theorem 2. For every privacy mechanism W ,
max
y∈Y
max
x1,x2∈X
W (x1, y)
W (x2, y)
≤ 1 +
ηTV(W )
W∗
, (17)
where W∗ := inf
x∈X
inf
y∈Y
W (x, y).
After some manipulations, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that, for
every privacy mechanism W ,
2ηTV(W )
1− ηTV(W )
≤ max
y∈Y
max
x,x′∈X
log
W (x, y)
W (x′, y)
− 1 ≤
ηTV(W )
W∗
.
(18)
As shown in the sequel, both bounds can be tight. These
inequalities show the connection between the local differential
privacy guarantee and the contraction properties of a privacy
mechanism.
B. Maximal Leakage (MaxL) based Privacy
The following theorem provides an upper bound for the
Dobrushin coefficient of a privacy mechanism in terms of its
MaxL privacy guarantee.
Theorem 3. If a privacy mechanism W is α-MaxL private,
ηTV(W ) ≤ min{1, 2
α − 1}. (19)
The following theorem provides a converse to Theorem 3,
i.e., provides an upper bound for the MaxL guarantee of a
privacy mechanism in terms of its Dobrushin coefficient.
Theorem 4. For every privacy mechanism W ,∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) ≤
|X |
2
(1 + ηTV(W )). (20)
In particular, Theorems 3 and 4 imply that,
1+ ηTV(W ) ≤
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) ≤
|X |
2
(1+ ηTV(W )), (21)
for every privacy mechanism W . Note that when |X | = 2,
(21) reduces to an equality. The inequalities in (21) show the
intrinsic relation between the MaxL privacy guarantee of a
privacy mechanism and its Dobrushin coefficient.
IV. ILLUSTRATION
A. Local Differential Privacy
Assume that X = Y = {1, . . . , k}. Consider the random-
ized response mechanism Wk,α : P(X )→ P(Y) defined by
Wk,α(x, y) =
2α − 1
2α + k − 1
1{x=y} +
1
2α + k − 1
. (22)
Note that Wk,α is α-locally differentially private. A straight-
forward computation shows that, for all P0, P1 ∈ P(X ),
‖Wk,α(P0)−Wk,α(P1)‖ =
2α − 1
2α + k − 1
‖P0 − P1‖, (23)
and thus ηTV(Wk,α) =
2α − 1
2α + k − 1
. The fact that (23) holds
for all P0, P1 ∈ P(X ) shows that the randomized response
mechanism contracts the space P(X ) in a uniform way. This
is a desirable property in terms of statistical utility. For the
binary setting,
ηTV(W2,α) =
2α − 1
2α + 1
, (24)
thus illustrating a case where the bound in Theorem 1 is tight.
Also, note that (W2,α)∗ = (2
α+1)−1. Thus implying that the
bound in Theorem 2 is also tight.
B. Maximal Leakage Privacy
Let X = Y = {0, 1}. For α ≤ 1, put ζα = 2−2
α. Consider
the privacy mechanism
Zα :=
(
1− ζα ζα
0 1
)
. (25)
Clearly, Zα is α-MaxL private. Furthermore, a straightforward
computation shows that, for all P0, P1 ∈ P({0, 1}),
‖Zα(P0)− Zα(P1)‖ = (1− ζα)‖P0 − P1‖. (26)
Hence, ηTV(Zα) = 1− ζα = 2α − 1. This type of Z-channel
mechanism has proved to be optimal for some problems under
maximal leakage constraints; see, for example, Liao et al. [11]
in the context of hypothesis testing.
V. MAXIMAL LEAKAGE ℓ2-MINIMAX RISK
In this section we analyze the maximal leakage ℓ2-minimax
risk, adapting the notion of local differential private minimax
risk in [2]. In particular, we provide lower and upper bounds
for the α-MaxL ℓ2-minimax risk with matching orders with
respect to the sample size and privacy level. A detailed
treatment of the non-private version of this problem can be
found in [12].
For probability distributions P,Q ∈ P(Z), we let ‖P−Q‖2
be their ℓ2-distance, i.e.,
‖P −Q‖22 =
∑
z∈Z
(P (z)−Q(z))2. (27)
Let ∆k be the set of distributions over [k] := {1, . . . , k}. By
definition, the ℓ2-minimax risk of a privacy mechanism W :
∆k → ∆m is given by
r
‖·‖22
k,n (W ) := inf
Pˆ
sup
P∈∆k
EW,P
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P‖22
)
, (28)
where the infimum is over all the estimators Pˆ : [m]n → ∆k
and EW,P (Z) denotes expectation of Z when Y1, . . . , Yn are
i.i.d. with distribution W (P ). For α ∈ [0,∞], we define the
α-MaxL ℓ2-minimax risk as
r
‖·‖22
α,k,n = inf
W∈Dα
r
‖·‖22
k,n (W ), (29)
where Dα denotes the set of all privacy mechanisms which
are α-MaxL private. The next proposition provides a lower
bound for r
‖·‖22
α,k,n. Our proof, which is provided at the end of
this section, relies on Le Cam’s method, as in Ye and Barg [3,
pp. 26–27], and (15).
Proposition 4. Let k ∈ N and α > 0 be given. There exists
N = N(k, α) such that, for all n > N ,
r
‖·‖22
α,k,n ≥
1
16n(2α − 1)
. (30)
By providing an achievability scheme, we provide an upper
bound for r
‖·‖22
α,k,n.
Proposition 5. Let k ∈ N and α > 0 be given. If 2α ≤ k,
then, for all n ∈ N,
r
‖·‖22
α,k,n ≤
k − 1
n(2α − 1)
. (31)
Note that when 2α > k, the constraint in Def. 2 becomes
vacuous. By Propositions 4 and 5,
r
‖·‖22
α,k,n = Θk
(
1
n(2α − 1)
)
. (32)
The notation f(n, α) = Θk(g(n, α)) denotes that there exists
N = N(k, α) such that, for all n > N ,
C1g(n, α) ≤ f(n, α) ≤ C2g(n, α), (33)
where C1, C2 > 0 are constants depending only on k. In
particular, the MaxL ℓ2-minimax risk is smaller than its L-DP
counterpart, see [3, Thm. II.5],
r
‖·‖22
α,k,n = Θk
(
2α
n(2α − 1)2
)
. (34)
Proof of Proposition 4. Let P0 ∈ ∆k be the uniform distri-
bution over [k], i.e., P0(x) = k
−1 for all x ∈ [k]. For a given
vector u ∈ Rk such that
∑
x ux = 0 and
∑
x u
2
x = 1, let
P1 ∈ ∆k be the distribution determined by
P1(x) =
1
k
+
ux√
n(2α − 1)
, x ∈ [k]. (35)
Note that if n ≥ k2/(2α − 1), then P1 indeed defines a
probability distribution. A direct computation shows that
‖P0 − P1‖2 =
1√
n(2α − 1)
. (36)
Fix an α-MaxL private mechanism W : ∆k → ∆m. For a
given estimator Pˆ , let
S(Pˆ ) :=
1
2
∑
i=0,1
EW,Pi
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− Pi‖
2
2
)
. (37)
Let K
Pˆ
:= {yn ∈ [m]n : ‖Pˆ (yn)− P0‖2 ≥ ‖Pˆ (y
n) − P1‖2}.
By (36) and the triangle inequality, for yn ∈ K
Pˆ
,
‖Pˆ (yn)− P0‖2 ≥
1
2
‖P0 − P1‖2 =
1
2
√
n(2α − 1)
, (38)
and, for yn ∈ Kc
Pˆ
,
‖Pˆ (yn)− P1‖2 ≥
1
2
‖P0 − P1‖2 =
1
2
√
n(2α − 1)
. (39)
Also, observe that
EW,P0
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P0‖
2
2
)
≥ EW,P0
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P0‖
2
21KPˆ
)
(40)
≥
1
4n(2α − 1)
EW,P0
(
1K
Pˆ
)
(41)
=
1
4n(2α − 1)
W (P0)
n(K
Pˆ
),
(42)
where W (P0)
n(K
Pˆ
) denotes the measure of K
Pˆ
with respect
to the n-fold tensor product measure W (P0) ⊗ · · · ⊗W (P0).
Using a similar argument, we obtain that
S(Pˆ ) ≥
1
8n(2α − 1)
[
W (P0)
n(K
Pˆ
) +W (P1)
n(Kc
Pˆ
)
]
. (43)
Recall that P (E)+Q(Ec) ≥ 1−‖P −Q‖ for every event E.
In particular,
S(Pˆ ) ≥
1
8n(2α − 1)
(1− ‖W (P0)
n −W (P1)
n‖) (44)
≥
1
8n(2α − 1)
(
1−
√
n
2
DKL(W (P1)‖W (P0))
)
,
(45)
where the last inequality follows from Pinsker’s inequality and
the tensorization property of the KL-divergence. By (15) and
Theorem 3, we obtain that
S(Pˆ ) ≥
1
8n(2α − 1)
(
1−
√
n(2α − 1)
2
DKL(P1‖P0)
)
.
(46)
A Taylor series expansion argument shows that for n large
enough n(2α − 1)DKL(P1‖P0) ≤ 1, and hence
S(Pˆ ) ≥
1
16n(2α − 1)
. (47)
Note that sup
P∈∆k
EW,P
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P‖22
)
≥ S(Pˆ ), thus
r
‖·‖22
k,n (W ) = inf
Pˆ
sup
P∈∆k
EW,P
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P‖22
)
≥ inf
Pˆ
S(Pˆ ).
(48)
By (47), we obtain that
r
‖·‖22
k,n (W ) ≥
1
16n(2α − 1)
. (49)
Since this inequality holds for any given α-MaxL private
mechanism W , the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let λ :=
2α − 1
k − 1
. Consider the map-
ping W : ∆k → ∆k+1 given by
W =


λ 1− λ
. . .
...
λ 1− λ

 . (50)
It is immediate to verify that W is α-MaxL private. Hence,
(29) readily implies that
r
‖·‖22
α,k,n ≤ r
‖·‖22
k,n (W ). (51)
Also, let Pˆ be the estimator determined by
Pˆ (x) =
k − 1
2α − 1
1
n
n∑
i=1
1Yi=x, x ∈ [k]. (52)
Hence, by (28) and (51),
r
‖·‖22
α,k,n ≤ sup
P∈∆k
EW,P
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P‖22
)
. (53)
We now estimate the right hand side term of (53).
For a given P ∈ ∆k, we let Q = W (P ) be the common
distribution of Y1, . . . , Yn. Note that Q(x) = λP (x) for all
x ∈ [k]. In particular,
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P‖22 =
1
(nλ)2
∑
x∈[k]
(
n∑
i=1
[
1Yi=x −Q(x)
])2
.
(54)
Using the fact that Q(x) = λP (x) for all x ∈ [k], we obtain
E
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P‖22
)
=
1
nλ2
∑
x∈[k]
Q(x)(1−Q(x)) (55)
=
1
nλ
∑
x∈[k]
P (x)(1 − λP (x)). (56)
Since
∑
x P (x)(1 − λP (x)) ≤ 1, we obtain that
E
(
‖Pˆ (Y n)− P‖22
)
≤
1
nλ
=
k − 1
n(2α − 1)
(57)
Since (57) holds for every P ∈ ∆k, by (53) the result follows.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have introduced a novel way to compare the statistical
costs of any privacy mechanism via the Dobrushin coefficient.
A significant advantage of this approach is that it eliminates
the need to compute the precise mechanism for any privacy
definition, which is often times difficult to obtain in closed
form. Many questions remain to be addressed including tighter
bounds for distribution estimation under MaxL constraints as
well as application to other statistical problems with different
privacy requirements.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
A. Local Differential Privacy Results
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following elemen-
tary observation.
Lemma 1. If a privacy mechanism W is α-locally differen-
tially private, then, for all x1, x2 ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
|W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)|
W (x1, y) +W (x2, y)
≤
2α − 1
2α + 1
. (58)
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that W (x1, y) ≥
W (x2, y). Note that (58) holds true if and only if
(2α + 1)(W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)) ≤ (2
α − 1)(W (x1, y) +W (x2, y)).
(59)
As the later holds if and only if W (x1, y) ≤ 2
αW (x2, y), and
W is α-locally differentially private, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1. For x1, x2 ∈ X , we define
S(x1, x2) :=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)|. (60)
Note that for every x1, x2 ∈ X , S(x1, x2) equals
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)|
W (x1, y) +W (x2, y)
[
W (x1, y) +W (x2, y)
]
. (61)
By the Lemma 1, we have that
S(x1, x2) ≤
2α − 1
2(2α + 1)
∑
y∈Y
[
W (x1, y) +W (x2, y)
]
(62)
=
2α − 1
2α + 1
. (63)
By (7), we obtain that ηTV(W ) ≤
2α − 1
2α + 1
, as required.
Proof of Theorem 2. Without loss of generality, assume that
max
y∈Y
max
x,x′∈X
log
W (x, y)
W (x′, y)
=
W (x2, y0)
W (x1, y0)
(64)
for some x1, x2 ∈ X and y0 ∈ Y . For ease of notation, let
η = ηTV(W ). By (7),
η = max
x,x′
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x, y)−W (x′, y)| (65)
≥
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x2, y)−W (x1, y)|. (66)
In particular, we have that
W (x2, y0)−W (x1, y0) ≤ 2η −
∑
y 6=y0
|W (x2, y)−W (x1, y)|.
(67)
An elementary computation shows that∑
y 6=y0
|W (x2, y)−W (x1, y)| ≥
∑
y 6=y0
W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)
(68)
=W (x2, y0)−W (x1, y0),
(69)
and hence
W (x2, y0)−W (x1, y0) ≤ 2η−(W (x2, y)−W (x1, y)), (70)
i.e., W (x2, y0)−W (x1, y0) ≤ η. Therefore,
W (x2, y0)
W (x1, y0)
≤ 1 +
ηTV(W )
W (x1, y0)
≤ 1 +
ηTV(W )
W∗
. (71)
The result follows.
B. Maximal Leakage Privacy Results
Proof of Thm. 3. For x1, x2 ∈ X , we define
S(x1, x2) :=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)|. (72)
Fix x1, x2 ∈ X . Let
Y+ = {y ∈ Y : W (x1, y) ≥W (x2, y)} (73)
and Y− = Y \ Y+. In particular, we have that
S(x1, x2) =
1
2
∑
y∈Y+
[
W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)
]
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y−
[
W (x2, y)−W (x1, y)
]
. (74)
Since, for every x ∈ X ,∑
y∈Y+
W (x, y) +
∑
y∈Y−
W (x, y) = 1, (75)
we have that
S(x1, x2) =
∑
y∈Y+
W (x1, y) +
∑
y∈Y−
W (x2, y)− 1 (76)
=
∑
y∈Y
max{W (x1, y),W (x2, y)} − 1, (77)
where the last equality follows from the definition of Y±. Note
that for all y ∈ Y ,
max{W (x1, y),W (x2, y)} ≤ max
x
W (x, y). (78)
Hence, S(x1, x2) ≤
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) − 1 ≤ 2α − 1, where
the last inequality follows as W is α-MaxL private. By (7),
we conclude that
ηTV(W ) = max
x1,x2∈X
S(x1, x2) ≤ 2
α − 1. (79)
Since ηTV(W ) ≤ 1 for every mapping W : P(X ) → P(Y),
the result follows.
Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 4, we prove
the following elementary lemma.
Lemma 2. If k > 1 and a1, . . . , ak are non-negative real
numbers, then there exist i1 6= i2 such that
a1 + · · ·+ ak
k
≤
ai1 + ai2
2
. (80)
Proof. Let s = a1 + · · ·+ ak. In order to reach contradiction,
assume that
ai1 + ai2
2
<
s
k
for all i1 6= i2. In this case,
∑
i1 6=i2
ai1 + ai2
2
<
∑
i1 6=i2
s
k
= (k − 1)s, (81)
where the last equality follows from the fact that
|{(i1, i2) : i1 6= i2}| = k(k − 1). (82)
In a similar way, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
|{(i1, i2) : i1 6= i2, i1 = i or i2 = i}| = 2(k − 1). (83)
In particular, we have that∑
i1 6=i2
ai1 + ai2
2
=
∑
i
∑
i1 6=i2
i1=i or i2=i
ai
2
= (k − 1)s. (84)
By (81), we conclude that (k− 1)s < (k− 1)s. Contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4. For each y ∈ Y , choose x(y) ∈ X such
that W (x(y), y) = max
x∈X
W (x, y). In particular,
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) =
∑
y∈Y
W (x(y), y). (85)
For each x ∈ X , let Yx := {y ∈ Y : x(y) = x}. Note that,∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) =
∑
y∈Y
W (x(y), y) (86)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Yx
W (x(y), y), (87)
where the last equality uses the fact that {Yx : x ∈ X} is
a partition of Y . Note that W (x(y), y) = W (x, y) for every
y ∈ Yx, thus∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Yx
W (x, y). (88)
By Lemma 2, (88) implies that there exist x1 6= x2 such that
2
|X |
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) ≤
∑
y∈Yx1
W (x1, y) +
∑
y∈Yx2
W (x2, y).
(89)
Note that for all y ∈ Yx1 ,W (x1, y) = W (x
(y), y) ≥W (x2, y)
and, in particular,
W (x1, y) = max{W (x1, y),W (x2, y)}. (90)
Also, W (x2, y) = max{W (x1, y),W (x2, y)} for all y ∈ Yx2 .
Altogether, we have that
2
|X |
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y) ≤
∑
y∈Yx1∪Yx2
max{W (x1, y),W (x2, y)}
≤
∑
y∈Y
max{W (x1, y),W (x2, y)},
(91)
where we used the fact that Yx1∩Yx2 = ∅ and Yx1∪Yx2 ⊂ Y .
Recall that, by (7),
ηTV(W ) = max
x,x′∈X
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x, y)−W (x′, y)|. (92)
In particular, we have that
ηTV(W ) ≥
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)| (93)
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y+
[
W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)
]
(94)
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y−
[
W (x2, y)−W (x1, y)
]
, (95)
where, as before, Y+ = {y ∈ Y : W (x1, y) ≥W (x2, y)} and
Y− = Y \ Y+. By (75) we obtain that
ηTV(W ) ≥
∑
y∈Y+
W (x1, y) +
∑
y∈Y−
W (x2, y)− 1. (96)
By definition of Y±, we conclude that
1 + ηTV(W ) ≥
∑
y∈Y
max{W (x1, y),W (x2, y)}. (97)
By (97) and (91), we conclude that
1 + ηTV(W ) ≥
2
|X |
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
W (x, y), (98)
as we wanted to show.
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